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Abstract
Empirical evidence  of currency  substitution  as measured  by dollarization  in I-atin
America usually  accords  with theoretical  explanations  [Calvo  and V6gh 1992  and
Giovannini and Turtelboom 1993]. But some  studies  find anomalies. For example,
Rogers  (1992a  and 1992b)  finds that between  L978  and 1982,  relative holdings  of
Mexdollars  were negatively  related  to expected  devaluation. The period when this effect
was  strongest  immediately  preceded  the imposition  of special  controls  on the conversion
of Mexdollar deposits  to cuffency,  and the nationalization  of the banks,  in 1982.
Accordingly,  Rogers  explains  this phenomenon  as  being  caused  by "convertibility  risk";
the convertibility  or rate of return depends  upon the level of reserves  in the Mexican
banking  system. Although Mexican  banks  took open  positions  relative to their dollar
accounts  and other dollar denominated  liabilities,  these  accounts  were backed  by reserve
requirements  and dollar denominated  loans. The expected  rate of return on Mexdollar
deposits,  therefore,  depended  on the solvency  of the banking  system.  We investigate  the
often cited [Calvo  and Vegh 1992]  but rarely tested  link between  dollarization,  currency
substitution,  and bank solvency.  In the Mexican  case,  we estimate  demand  equations  for
real peso  and Mexdollar deposit  demand. We find that measures  of demand  for
Mexdollar deposits  are negatively  and significantly  related  to the share  of bank loans  that
are overdue. As is consistent  with hypotheses  developed  in this paper,  the same  camot
be said  for measures  of demand  for peso-denominated  deposits.
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University  of Texas  at Austin, John Rogers  of Pennsylvania  State  University,  and Moises
Schwartz  of the Banco  de Mexico  for supplying  us with crucial data. We would also  like
to thank Shengyi  Guo for research  assistance.Introduction
The literature  on dollarization has recently moved in several new directions whose
interconnections  appeax  not to have  been  fully appreciated.  On the one hand,  Rogers
(1,992a  md  1992b)  presents  econometric  models  that find negative  and statistically
significant  relations  between  a measure  of devaluation  expectations  and holdings  of
doliar-denominated  accounts  (Mexdollars)  in Mexican  financial institutions. These
findings  contrast  with conventional  theories  of currency  substitution,  which posit that
Mexicans  would increase  their Mexdollar  holdings  relative  to their peso  account  holdings
as  expected  devaluation  increased.  In explaining  his counterintuitive  results,  Rogers
relies  on a "convertibility  risk" argument. That is, he argues  that a significant  number  of
depositors  (correctly)  anticipated  a breakdown  of full convertibility  between  Mexdollars
and actual  dollars,  and precipitated  a run on Mexdollar accounts.  In fact, the decline  in
Mexdollar deposits  in the months  before Mexico abridged  convertibility  is striking.
However,  while Rogers'  results  are consistent  with the convertibility  argument,  he does
not offer statistical  tests  to isolate  to convertibility  problems  the cause  of his
counterintuitive  results.
Moving the literature of currency  substitution/dollarization  in another  direction,
Calvo and V€gh (1992)  offer arguments  that may not at first blush  seem  directly
connected  to Rogers'  work.  In a discussion  of the problems  an economy  may have  with
full dollarization  - in which,  as  in the case  of Panam4 a country  simply  uses  another
country's  currency  as its own - Calvo and Ydgh (1992)  note that the system  would be
forced to operate  w.ithout  a lender  of last resort. Calvo and V6gh argue  that thisobservation  is particularly  relevant  if dollarization  is implemented  to cure a case  of
persistently  high inflation, as  was  clearly  the case  in a number of I-atin American
countries  in the late 1970s.  Suppose  the fiscal  imbalance  that motivated  the government
to inflate is not wiped out at the same  time dollarization  is adopted. Then banls will be
under pressure  to lend to the government  and to enterprises  that were previous
beneficiaries  of the revenue  from inflationary  money  creation. As a result,  "the quality
of the loan portfolio held by domestic  banks  will tend to be poor according  to
international  standards,  a situation  that could  give rise to bank runs and a collapse  of the
financial system."  [Calvo  and Y€gh 1992:71.
Although Calvo and V6gh do not discuss  the issue,  events  bearing  some
similarities  to their full-dollarization  scenario  may occur  in the context  of less-than-full
dollarization. Not only may these  events  trigger the countedntuitive  flight from
Mexdollars  that is described  by Rogers,  but a consideration  of them may allow
econometric  tests  to identily the process  that generated  this flight.
Suppose,  for example,  that an underlying  fiscal  imbalance  surfaces  at a time when
dollar-denominated  bank accounts  are legal,  or that a negative  shock  to the export sector
occurs  at this time.  As before,  the quality of the domestic  banks'  loan portfolio worsens.
Defaults  become  likely and the central  bank may be called  upon to act as lender of last
resort. Unlike the case  in the Calvo and V6gh (1992)  paradigrrL  the central  bank can
still act as  such  a lender  because  dollarization  is not complete.
Even so,  a similarity to Calvo and V6gh's  (1992)  paradigm  surfaces  whenever  both
the Deso  denominated  debt and dollar denominated  debt are issued  in Mexico and doilar
Ldenominated  debt is extended  with the backing  of Mexdollar deposits.  The central  banl<
can act as a lender of last resort  to back  peso-denominated  deposits  as  long as  it can
print pesos,  but it can act as a lender of last resort to back Mexdollars  only as  long as  it
has  dollar reserves.
As a result,  the process  identified by Rogers  may be detailed  as  follows. When
the premiurn  on forward pesos  rises  because  of increased  devaluation  expectations,
depositors  would move  further into Mexdollars  because  the dollar-denominated  assets
appreciate  in terms of pesos  in the wake of a devaluation  - other things  equal. But other
things  are not equal. Deteriorations  in loan quality at the commercial  banks  trigger
concerns  over  what Rogers'  identifies  as convertibility  risk.
These  deteriorations  suggest  that dollars  sufficient  to compensate  nervous
depositors  may not be forthcoming  in the form of repalnnents  from borrowers. Since
dollars  are not flowing to businesses,  the central  bank will not be accumulating  reserves
either. As a result,  agents  who wish to hold dollars  express  their desires  through  other
financial  instruments  than Mexdollar deposits,  or hold cash  dollars. That is, growth in
the share  of bad loans  may be expected  to dampen  the demand  for Mexdollars.
Conversely,  because  the central  bank can continue  to serve  as  lender of last resort for
deposits  in the nationai currency,  growth  in the share  of problem loans  should  not
negatively  affect  the real level of peso  deposits.
If this modification  of Calvo and V6gh's  (1992)  paradigm  accurately  characterizes
the process  that motivates  Rogers'  (1992a  and 1992b)  results,  then the insertion  of a
measure  of bank loan quality in Rogers'  Mexdollar demand  equations  not only ought tohave  significant  results,  but the counterintuitive  coefficient  on the devaluation
expectations  variable ought  then to take on the conventional  sign. However,  including  a
measure  of bank loan quality into a similar money  demand  equation  - but one for peso-
denominated  deposits  - should  not show  that an increasing  share  of bad loans  dampens
demand  for peso  deposits.
We find that the insertion  of a measure  of bank loan quality into Rogers'
dollarization  model gives  a result  that is consistent  with the arguments  provided  above.
That is, when the left-hand-side  variable  is the real value of Mexdollar deposits  in the
Mexican  banking  system,  the insertion  of a ratio of past-due  loans  (cartera  vencida)  to
overall loans  (cartera  total) as  a right-hand-side  variable takes  on the expected  negative
sign  and that - in contradistinction  to Rogers'  results,  the forward premium takes  on the
conventionaliy  expected  positive  sign. Moreover,  in an equation  that characterizes
demand  for peso  accounts,  the ratio of cartera  vencida  (as a right-hand-side  variable)
takes  on a positive  sign.
Justification fmm an Optimizing Framework
The following model is a variant of Calvo and Vdgh (1991). Consumers  maximize





l*t  e -- EP'/P or the real exchange  rat€, m = M/EP'  or real holdings  ofdomestic  currency  deposits  expressed  in foreign curency prices  of tradable  goods,  and f
= F/P'or  real holdings  of foreign curency deposits  where E is the nominal exchange
rate, P is the domestic  price of non-traded  goods,  P' is the foreign  price of traded  goods,
M is the nominal amount  of domestic  cuffency  deposits  held by domestic  residents,  and
F is the amount of foreign currency  deposits  held by domestic  residents.
The first constraint  is a liquidity in advance  constraint. We assume  that liquidity
services  are produced  in accordance  with a linearly homogeneous  production  function in
m and f.
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where o is the proportion of non-performing  loans  to total loans. Here we assurne  for
simplicity  that the central  bank fully backs  peso  deposits  but does  not guarantee  dollar
deposits  at all.  (1-e) is the proportion of dollar deposits  individuals  expect  to redeem  at
any  point in time.
The second  constraint  defines  the stock  of assets  available  at any  one time, 4.
We assume  that individuals  hold only foreign and domestic  curency deposits.
dr=frrt  (1 -ey,
Finally, the intertemporal  budget  constraint  is
(3)"..i:  {dJ  .  o'-  tfl ':  -  "^,-  *)"  =  '  (4)
where e is the (expected)  rate of nominal depreciation  of the domestic  cunency.
Maximizing  equation  (1) subject  to equations  (2), and (4)  over consumption  of
traded and non-traded  goods  and holdings  of domestic  and foreign curency accounts
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in addition to the constraints  (2) and (4).  Here, Lr is the l-agrange  multiplier associated
with constraint  (4) and ,1,  is the l,agrange  multiplier associated  with constraint  (2).




















Equation (9) shows  that consumers  equate  the marginal  utility of tradable  goods
consumption  to the shadow  pdce of wealth multiplied by a measure  of the price of
tradable  goods  lCalvo and V6gh 1991,:74).  This price has  two components:  1) the money
price (=  1) plus the cost  of producing  liquidity services  to buy one unit of the good (=
e/1,). Equation (10) has  consumers  equating  the marginal  rate of substitution  in
consumption  between  tradable  and non-tradable  goods  equal to the relative  price of
tradables. A further discussion  of the properties  of the standard  outcomes  of optimizing
models  can  be found in Calvo and V€gh (1991  and 1992).
The interesting  result for our purposes,  however,  is contained  in equation  (11).
This equation  says  that consumers  equate  the marginal  rate of transformation  in liquidity
services  to the relative  price of each  currency  adjusted  for the rate of insolvency  of the
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Increases  in the perceived  insolvency  of the banking  system  do not have  an
unambiguous effect on the demand for domestic and foreign cuffency deposits.  However,
two considerations  should  be kept in mind from equations  (12) and (13). The first is
that the effect on the demand  for pesos  of an increase  in insolvency  is always  opposite  to
that of pesos. Mathematically,  this stems  from the fact that the numerators  of equations
(12) and (13) are the same  and the denominators  have  opposite  sign. That is, the
denominator  of equation  (12) is everywhere  negative  and the denominator  of equation
(13) is everywhere  positive. Second,  if the direct effect  on liquidity of an increase  in
insolvency  - the first element  of the numerator  - dominates  the secondary  effects  on
liquidity - the second  term, individuals  will shift out of foreign currency  deposits  into
domestic  curency deposits  if the solvency  of the banking  system  detedorates. We find
this outcome  to be the most plausible.
Differentiating  equation  (11) with respect  to e yields  the usual  results  that an
increase  in expected  devaluation  decreases  holdings  of domestic  curency deposits  and
incteases  holdings  of foreign curency deposits.  Here the denominator  of equation  (14 )
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Notice that increases  in insolvency  increase  the sensitivity  of demand  for assets  to
changes  in expected  devaluation. Of course,  to explore  the fulI implications  of this
specification,  we would need  to model the banking  sector,  and the central  bank and
government  to endogenously  determine  €.  However,  this would exceed  the scope  of this
paper and is left to further research.
An Econometric  Specifrcation
The model of money  demand  we estimate  is based  upon those  of Cuddington  (1983),
Branson  and Henderson  (1985), and Rogers  (1992)  and is consistent  with the
optimizing  framework  above. We assume  that all assets  held by individuals  are
imperfect  substitutes.  Domestic  residents  can  hold a number of assets  including
domestic  currency  and foreign currenry,  domestic  and foreign currency  denominated
accounts  in the domestic  banking  system,  domestic  and foreign cunency  denominated
domestic  bonds,  foreign bonds  and deposits.  Again,  we focus  on the demand  for
domestic  (peso)  and dollar currency  (Mexdollar) bank accounts  created  by the Mexican
banking  system.
(14)
(1s) >0The demand  for real peso  ba.lances  takes  the forml
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where M is the value of peso  (non-interest  bearing)  demand  deposits,  P is the price
level,  i is the 90-day  Mexican  Treasury  Bill or CETES rate, i*  is the three month dollar
interest  rate on Mexdollar accounts  (assumed  equal  to zero),  e is the expected  rate of
depreciations,  i' is the three-month  U.S.  Treasury  Bill Rate,  y is industrial  production  in
Mexico,  e is the ratio of non-performing  to total loans  in the Mexican  Banking  system,
and g,(e) is a function  which translates  the non-performing  loan ratio into individual
perceptions  of how much of the principal they  will recover  in the event  of a systemic
insolvency  problem in the banking  system.  The sign  of this function  for peso  deposits  is
indeterminate;  it is a choice  variable  whose  value  is established  by the Bank of Mexico's
willingness  to guarantee  peso  deposits.  Underlying  this function is a game,  between  the
banks  and the Bank of Mexico,  that involves  sedous  time consistenry  problems.
Although Mexico did not have  a deposit  insurance  scheme  in this period, the strength  of
the time inconsistency  of not backing  peso  deposits  probably  would render the sign  of g,'
positive. We assume  this to be the case.
1A number  of assumptions  are implicit in these  formulations. See  Rogers  (1992b)
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where M' are Mexdollar balances  in dollars  and E is the exchange  rate (pesos/dollar).
The derivative  of the expected  percentage  of principal regained  in the event  of a
banking  crisis  for Mexdollars,  g',  is assumed  to be negative  in contrast  to that for peso
deposits.  The Bank of Mexico can act fully as  a lender of last resort  in the case  of pesos
because  it can create  pesos. But the Bank of Mexico cannot  create  dollars and its ability
to back Mexdollars  in the case  of a financial  crisis  depends  upon its dollar reserves  and
its ability to accumulate  them with exchange  rate and monetary  policies.
A semi-log  formulation of these  two equations  is
t(fl  = are + a"i + arln(y)  + a.@ (18)
r(+)  = b,e  + b,i + b,tn(y)  + bnc, (1e)
Most studies  take the difference  between  equations  (18) and (19) and then
estimate  the following equation
11Estimating equation (20) instead of equations (18) and (19) would not allow us to
identify the separate effects of systemic banking problems on the demand for each of
these assets. Hence, we will estimate using a error-correction cointegration framework
equations (18) and (19). Hence, we first test for the orders of integration and
cointegration and then test the long-term and short-term determinants of the demand for
each of these assets.'
Integration and Cointegration: The Demand for Real Pesos and Mexdollars
The data span January 1978 to October 1985, the opening and closing of forward peso
trading in New York, for M, P, i, y, e, E, and M' measured in logarithms, and come from
the Bank of Mexico's Indicadores Economicos. Expected depreciation, e, is measured as
the percentage difference between the three-month forward rate on pesos in New York
and the spot rate. The proportion of non-performing loans (cartera vencida) to total
loans in the Mexican banking system was calculated using data from the Comision
Nacional Bancaria's Boletfn Estadistico.
3
2We do not include the foreign interest rate i' in the estimations. Its exclusion
does not change the results in any significant way.
3Because of an accounting change in 1983, a dummy variable is used to control for
the once and for all shift in measurement of non-performing loans in the estimation
below.
12Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  tests  on the levels  and first differences  of the data
appear  in Table L with trend. All series  contain  a unit root but are stationary  after first
differencing.
The fact that the series  are endogenous  variables  and are I(1) implies that for
equilibrium in the markets  for pesos  and Mexdollars  to hold, real pesos  and Mexdollars
must  be cointegrated  with variables  on the fight hand side  of equations  (3) and (a)."
The long-term  relationship  corresponds  to the cointegrating  relationship(s)  while the
short-term  dynamics  bring the variables  back  to the long-term  relationship  after some
type of shock. The natural way to estimate  the dynamics  is to identifu  the cointegrating
vectors  and then estimate  the short-term  dynamics  in an error-correction  specification
[Engle and Granger 1987].
We use  the maximum  likelihood technique  of Johansen  (1988)  and  Johansen  and
Juselius  (1990). It entails  estimating  the following error-correction  representation  of the
(px1)  vector  time series  X,
L,X,=aptXr_r_,  +r,(Z)AX'_1  +lz(L)AXuz  *...*Il_r(I)AXrr+p  + e,  QL)
where B' is the cointegrating  vector,  ais the error-correction  coefficient,  p is a trend, and
the r, describe  the short-term  dynamics  of the system.
We focus  on identifying  the long-term  cointegrating  relationships  in this section
while we leave  estimation  of the short-term  dvnamics  to the next section. The
uFull scale  structural  specifications  of an economy  wide model may imply more
than one cointegrating  relationship  exist.
13cointegrating  vector S' is obtained  by solving  the following eigenvalue  problem
lts}t-si,s;sdl  =o (22)
where So  are the residual  moment matrices  from the OLS regressions  of AX  and X,* on
AX,i, i=  0, k and  j  = 1, .,.,  k-1. The estimated  S' corresponds  to the matrix of
eigenvectors  while the (maximum)  eigenvalues  and their sum,  i.e. the trace,  are used  to
test  the rank of the matrix tr = aB'. The rank of II corresponds  to the number  of
independent  cointegrating  vectors  r.  Notice that if Rank(tr) = r = p, any  vector is a
cointegrating  vector because  the original series  X, is stationary. If Rank(tr) = r < p,
then the series  is I(1) and r cointegrating  vectors  exist. If Rank(tr)=1=0, ns
cointegrating  vectors  exist  and a VAR based  purely upon first differences  describes  the
full dynamics  of the system.
Tables  2 and 3 present  tests  for the number  of cointegrating  vectors  for real peso
deposit  demand  and real Mexdollar demand. The trace tests  show  at least  two
cointegrating  vectors  for real peso  demand  and at least  three cointeglating  vectors  for
real Mexdollar demand,  while the maximum  eigenvalue  tests  show  two cointegrating
vectors  for real peso  demand  and three for real Mexdollar demand.
These  tables  also  report the point estimates  of the components  of B' and a for the
Iargest  eigenvalue  and  use  likelihood ratio tests  to see  if they are significantly  different
from zero. All  the coefficients  of the B's  are significantly  different from zero  while all
the a's are significantly  different from zero except  possibly  the a for the real peso
equation  (0.05 < p-value < 0.1).
14The estimated  long-run  relationships  are as  follows:
t(#)  = -88.31e  - 8.s7i  - 0.531n(])  +  o.z4o Q3)
I Err*  |
l"l:=l  = 94.55e  + 0.256i  - 8.951n(y)  -  1.380
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(24)
In the long run, an increase  in the non-performing  loan ratio increases  real peso
demand  and decreases  real dollar deposit  demand  while an increase  in expected
devaluation  decreases  real peso  demand  and increases  real dollar deposit  demand.
These  results,  therefore,  account  for the strange  behavior  found by Rogers  (1992a  and
1992b). Controlling for changes  in non-performing  loans  restores  the expected
relationship  between  expected  depreciation  and the demand  for real peso  and Mexdollar
deposits.
Short-Term  Dynamics
Tables  4 and 5 present  the results  for single-equation  error-correction  estimates.s  A1l
the coefficients  of the variables  in each  of the equations  have  expected  signs  but some
are not significantly  different from zero. For example,  changes  in peso  interest  rates,  Ai,
'Since all the a's are significantly  different from  zero none of the variables  are
weakly  exogenous  except  perhaps  real peso  deposits  [Johansen  1992a  ard 1992b  and
Ericsson  1992]. Because  of the lack of sufficient  weak exogeneity,  estimating  the
parameters,  in this case  only the a's and f's, in a single  equation  context  will produce
inefficient results  as the parameters  are not variation free. These  estimates,  however,
are still consistent  and the results  accord  with the lons term results  reported above.are only marginally  significant  at the fourth lag while changes  in expected  devaluation,  e,
do not significantly  affect real peso  demand.u
On the other hand,  the coefficients  central  to our hypothesis,  namely  the ones
corresponding  to the ratio of non-performing  to total loans  in both demand  equations
and expected  devaluation  the demand  for real Mexdollars,  are significantly  different from
zero and have  the expected  signs. Increases  in the non-performing  loan ratio, all else
equal,  cause  an increase  in real peso  demand  and a decrease  in real Mexdollar demand.
We argue  in detail in the conclusion  that this reflects  the difference  in the willingness
and ability of the Bank of Mexico  to back these  assets  as a lender of last resort. Also,
increases  in expected  rates  of devaluation  significantly  increase  the demand  for real
Mexdollar  balances  contrary  to the findings  of Rogers  (1992a  and 1992b)  but in
accordance  with most theories  of currency  substitution.
Conclusion
We have  hypothesized  that the mechanics  that underlie Mexdollar depositors'
concerns  about convertibility  risk [Rogers  (1992a  and 1992b]  may  involve  an amended
version  of Calvo and Vegh's  (1992)  lender-oflast-resort  hypothesis.  While Calvo and
V€gh's  hypothesis  encompasses  regimes  where  full dollarization  is operative,  the
oCalvo  and V6gh (i992:18) and Thomas  (1985)  argue  that in reasonably  efficient
financia.l  markets,  optimizing  models  imply a specification  that includes  either foreign
and domestic  interest  rates  or expected  devaluation  but not both. We did not want to
make  a piori  assumptions  about Mexican's  abilities  to bonow in pesos  at a reasonable
cost. Hence,  the more general  specification  chosen  here. The fact that interest  rates  do
not show  major significance  in the short-term  gives  some  credence  to the optimizing
specification  for Mexico.
16amended  hypothesis  accounts  for regimes  in which a domestic  currency  is still the legal
medium of exchange  but Mexdollar deposits  are encouraged  to serve  as  "insulation  from
the outflow of short-term  capital." [Rogers  (1992b;  188]. Here, the central  bank can
serve  as a lender of last resort for peso-denominated  accounts  as  long as  it can create
pesos. But this same  central  bank cannot  seate dollars. Accordingly,  the central  bank's
ability to serve  as a lender of last resort  to cover  dollar-denominated  accounts  lasts  only
as  long as it has  enough  dollar reserves  to commit to the process  and the willingness  to
commit them. As a result,  increasingly  poor Mexican  bank loan quality in a period like
that of the late 1970s  and early 1980s  could have  been  expected  to have  a significantly
negative  effect  upon the demand  for Mexdollar  accounts  but not upon the demand  for
peso-denominated  accounts. These  last are implicitly covered  by the central  bank's  peso
lender-of-last  resort function.
If the role of deteriorating  loan quality has  been accounted  for in an equation
that characterizes  the demand  for Mexdollars  in such  a period, then a variable (in the
same  equation)  designed  to capture  devaluation  expectations  should  take on the
conventional  positive  sign. That is, other things  equal,  depositors  may be expected  to
increase  their demands  for Mexdollars  as  expected  devaluations  increase. If our
amended  lender-of-last-resort  hypothesis  is correct,  then adding  statistical  considerations
of deteriorating  loan quality should  be tantamount  to taking account  of other-things-
equal considerations.  In sum,  a fuller specification  of a demand-for-Mexdollars  equation
should  have  allowed  the equation  to capture  the conventional  wisdom  of dollarization
theory.
t7These  considerations  are all confirmed  by the model. Although our Mexdollar
model is of the same  construct  as that of Rogers  (except  for our addition of the loan
quality variable),  and covers  the same  observation  period that his does,  the devaluation
expectations  variable  in our Mexdollar  demand  equation  takes  on the expected  positive
sign,  while it is negative  in Rogers'  model.
In addition,  the sign  taken on by our deteriorating  loan quality variable (cartera
vencida  divided  by cartera  total) is negative  and significant  in the Mexdollar demand
equation,  but is actually  positive  in the peso  account  demand  equation. These  results  are
consistent  with the version  of the lender-oflast-resort  hypothesis  that we offer.
The results  may also  shed  some  light on another  anomaly  observed  in countries
with high inflation and currency  substitution:  in many  cases,  dollarization  increases  after
inflation and exchange  rates  are stabilized.' In our view,  if stabilization  brings  an
improvement  of banking  sector  health,  the necessity  of the central  bank to act as a
lender of last resort also  should  diminish,thus  allowing  for an expansion  of dollar
liabilities. Needless  to say,  further theoretical  and empirical  work is necessary.
Still, we hope that our model has  enriched  understanding  of the mechanics
underlying  the convertibility  risk phenomenon  so gracefully  characterized  by Rogers
(1992a  and 1992b). We also  hope that this model has  helped  to clarifu some  of the
implications  that cenftal bank capacity  and commitment  may have  for the phenomenon
of dollarization.
'Melvin and Ladman  (1991),  Melvin and Fenske  (7992),  and  Clements  and
Schwartz  (1992)  document  this phenomenon  for Bolivia and Rodriguez  (1992)  documents
it for Argentina and Peru,
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Four lags  for levels  and two lags  for changes  were used  in these
tests  of stationarity  for all variables.  The lag structure  was  chosen  by
adding  lags  until the Q(21) statistic  did not reject the null hypothesis
of autocorrelated  residuals. The test results  were not sensitive  to
the choice  of lag length.
Variable significantiy  violates  normality assumption  either because
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